

# The Silicon Ideology Revisited

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November 19, 2017

This essay is dedicated to the memory of Mark Fisher

## 1 Autocritique

There is much to criticise in “The Silicon Ideology”. While “The Silicon Ideology” alluded to the recent development of capitalism, it did not tie the history of the alt-right to the motion of Kapital. In addition, the use of “emotion” to describe drive in Benjamin’s theory of fascism was crude. Furthermore, the attempts at formulating a praxis should have been left out altogether or clarified as mere notes, not a real answer—some of them have indeed turned out to be entirely useless (such as the “boy who cried wolf” fear) while others have proven somewhat more useful (the use of doxxing is still somewhat effective).

## 2 On Angela Nagle

Since the publishing of “The Silicon Ideology”, Angela Nagle (who wrote *Kill All Normies*) has become the “expert” on the alt-right consulted by much of the Left. Yet Nagle’s account of the alt-right, and in particular *how* it is politicized are quite troubling: it both obfuscates the real history of the alt-right and uses it as a crude hammer in support of the vulgar chauvinism too-often practiced by the Left. In the end, Nagle’s account treats the alt-right on their own terms: it cedes too quickly their claims to counterculture—more than that, it *uses* them to argue for not for a smarter but a cruder Left. Transgression in Nagle’s account is purely a politics of the Right and never the Left; as Cummings (2017) retorts: “[never] mind the intrinsic, if haphazard, links between the far Left and sixties counterculture, in particular in the Bay Area and London. Never mind the punk scene’s Rock Against Racism initiative, ACT-UP, Black Lives Matter. Just about every social movement over the last half century has its connotative codes, rituals and even sardonic choices declared to be reactionary. It’s as if Nagle was a Stalinist commissar imagining it’s 1934 and surrealism is hers to declare “decadent””. It, in Nagle’s account, is the origin of the alt-right but also of so-called “Tumblr Liberalism”, which she equivocates clumsily to the alt-right—indeed, in Nagle’s account, the alt-right’s emergence is to blame on “Tumblr Liberalism”. Not only is this politically chauvinistic (calls for genocide and a fairly mild liberal feminism are now held to be equivalent), it has no basis in fact: the alt-right has deeper historical origins than any engagement with “Tumblr Liberalism” *on the Right*: it emerges from the motion of Kapital in the Long Downturn and its prime antecedent in the US is paleoconservatism, not subculture. As Moufawad-Paul (2017) notes:

The reason why people gravitate towards the alt-right is not because of the behaviour of leftists but because, primarily, racism is an organic option for a white male who has been taught to see any reform (no matter how paltry) at creating a level playing field as a personal attack. These are people who do not like being told that they cannot be in control of everything, whose white identity is fragile when subjected to critique, and who thus seek to reinvigorate a sense of power by submerging themselves in a current that never went away in a colonial and imperialist social formation: white supremacy. Moreover, fascism is always an option in capitalist societies; it is an immanent possibility because of what capitalism is: in *Austerity Apparatus* I called it the capitalist “state of emergency” that is always lurking within in every capitalist society. I mean, just think about it rationally: how does a white dude living in his well-to-do parents’ basement suddenly become a raving racist? To assume that all of these people are experiencing psychological ruptures because of dealing with self-righteous leftists simply begs the question: if they did make such a choice because of a bunch of SJWs dog-piling them then we really do need to ask why it was so easy to choose neo-Nazism as an option. Because it already was the option, the primary and most intoxicating option, presented to everyone who is taught to locate their identity in white settlerism. And all we need to do is read what these people have written before declaring their new Nazi identities to realize it wasn’t much of a rupture to begin with, nor are these the kinds of people whose thought patterns would wildly change after being attacked by leftists: the vast majority of them were anti-leftist to begin with and, more importantly, obsessed with the idea that their individual and unsubstantiated views about reality are correct. Even more importantly: these are the people who were leading abuse charges before SJWs attacked them; they were always the abusers, the trolls, the self-proclaimed online elite.

This critique, Moufawad-Paul (2017) points out, has a history in the North American right:

In the early 1990s, for example, John Singleton’s *Higher Learning* included a sub-plot about an otherwise “nice” white kid who gets pushed into being a neo-Nazi because his alienation is reinforced by black people and university intellectuals who are mean to him. I saw that movie when it came out and, even though I was in grade ten, I still felt there was something a little off about it: why the hell would somebody become a raving Nazi willing to shoot people from a bell tower simply because he was challenged? I felt that I was missing something, that there had to be some other facet that the movie did not depict, that would result in what was supposed to be an ideological rupture. Hell, go back further: anti-communist propaganda was obsessed with arguing that “communist agents” were causing unrest by setting labour against management, as if there was nothing antagonistic in this relationship by itself because otherwise in happy USAmerica everyone just wants to get along. Anti-Civil Rights propaganda used a variant of this discourse, its most virulent ideologues claiming that Black Americans were otherwise happy with

Jim Crow if it wasn't for some deep seeded communist agitation.

Nagle's account, in bad faith, equates (using Walter Benn Michaels) any action against white supremacy, misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, and ableism with the bourgeois "cultural studies" discipline and its priorities—and this is not even mentioning the transphobic dogwhistles the book itself contains, as noted in Cummings (2017). To be sure, the latter is to be rejected; but the former is necessary for any anti-capitalist politics. The moves Nagle makes, as Cummings (2017) shows, are patently absurd:

But underneath it all the book does have politics, and this is a classic sleight of hand – to attack those to one's left by associating them with those to one's right. The politics Nagle is espousing are that of a parlour trick. She repeatedly throughout the book will combine in a single paragraph or even a single sentence a perfectly reasonable and defensible left position – let's say Justin Trudeau being a white supremacist – with an absurd one – Hillary Clinton being a feminist and "Bernie Bros" being anti-feminist. So, to be clear, Nagle is saying to Indigenous people and the great swathe of the Left that have finally come to support Indigenous social movements that they are the equivalent of a liberal because they justifiably argue that, even if personally Justin is a nice guy with a tattoo, he is not your friend, he is an upholder of white supremacy. Opposing Justin Trudeau and the Canadian Liberal Party's history of white supremacy is the same as supporting Hillary Clinton against Bernie Sanders. Okay.

This is not a revolutionary socialist politics: this is the politics of Jacobin Magazine; a mild social-democrat position that owes far too much to the Gramscian-Derridean Laclau-Mouffe neo-Eurocommunism it claims to despise than to any Left movement it attempts to wear the skin of.

### 3 Contemporary Fascism and the Motion of Kapital

Contemporary fascism is deeply connected to the recent motion of capital, especially as described in Srnicek (2016). Drawing on well-established literature, recapitulated in the first chapter of Srnicek (2016), we mark 1973 as the beginning of a new epoch of capitalism, the "Long Downturn", with dropping profitability (the only exception thus far being the 1990s dot-com bubble). In reaction, Fordism was abandoned in favor of Toyotism (just-in-time manufacturing and supply-chain management), goods were increasingly customized, and businesses began to offshore labor to cheaper locations (which undermined the power of labor in the metropole) and contract out labor in the metropole. From 1978 onwards, this was combined with the policies of neoliberalism: the destruction of the welfare-state, increasing restriction of labor and disciplining of unions, the move to free trade (and thus the further decentralization of the supply-chain), "structural adjustment" forced upon the Third World by the IMF and World Bank, the multiplication of "special economic zones" (i.e. cheap, flexible labor zones), deregulation and privatization of industry, weakening enforcement of labor law, environmental law, financial regulations, and antitrust law, the growth of the prison system, et cetera.

The exception to the Long Downturn was the 1990s: the dot-com bubble, when the Internet (up till then "largely non-commercial") was commercialized. Financial specula-

tion (driven by venture capital) drove the boom, focusing in particular on the telecommunications industry. It is in precisely this industry that neo-reaction finds its earliest beginnings; among the bourgeois who it would enrich. The burst of the bubble in 2001 meant that the “lean company” model prevalent then began to be abandoned in favor of *platform capitalism*, Srnicek (2016) posits, a trend which would however only develop into its myriad current forms and become dominant in the age of austerity following the 2008 crisis. The trend ever since has been towards tax evasion and cash hoarding, which, as Srnicek (2016) notes leaves tech corporations with vast cash reserves and reinforces austerity. In addition, since the 1990s there has been “a long-term trends towards both greater proletarianisation and greater numbers of surplus populations”, which of course means a more disciplined, more vulnerable working class.

What is platform capitalism? According to Srnicek (2016), platforms are intermediaries enabling interaction in a particular way between different groups of people, often including tools for “users to build their own products, services, and marketplaces”, which rely on network effects (its value increases as more users use it, thus making it a natural monopoly in whatever activity it facilitates) and meaning that companies will often use cross-subsidization to entice new users to sign up, and which through their role as monopolies over mediating a particular form of interaction gain the power to legislate the rules of such interaction, giving them a quasi-governmental role. Platforms often rely on data collection and sale for profits, giving them incentives to engage in mass surveillance. There are several sorts of platforms: advertising platforms (such as Google), cloud platforms (Amazon Web Services), industrial platforms (aka “the industrial internet of things”, or “Industry 4.0”, characterized by the idea that “each component in the production process becomes able to communicate with assembly machines and other components, without the guidance of workers or managers” through data sharing: GE, Siemens), product platforms (Zipcar, Spotify—but also Rolls Royce, GE, John Deere; keyword “goods as a service”), and lean platforms (Uber, Airbnb). The governmental role of these corporations (a premonition of the imminent total fusion of State and Kapital), combined with the current situation of capital as a whole, is linked to neo-reactionary politics in ways which should be obvious.

## 4 On Fascism

One element noted in autocritique is the theory of fascism espoused in Armistead (2016), which could not come to terms with the variation in regimes and in ideologies described as fascist, especially in a context outside of Europe, and which was based on a very limited range of theories of fascism.

### 4.1 The Description of Fascism in “The Silicon Ideology”

1. Fascism is one of two forms of bourgeois rule, the other being bourgeois democracy. There are no *primary differences*, but there are *secondary differences*
2. Fascism emerges in the shadow of a failed revolution; that is, at times when bourgeois rule is weak, but a revolution has either failed, been betrayed by centrist, “Social Democrat” forces, or, similarly, been forestalled/delayed: in the latter case, the turn to fascism is an attempt to block a revolutionary movement from forming or gaining success.

3. Fascism transforms politics and its promise of revolutionary change into a commodity—it thusly *aestheticizes* politics, giving the masses the intensity of emotion associated with revolutionary change but maintaining an even stronger devotion to maintaining bourgeois rule and property-relations
4. In order to maintain these emotions, fascism constructs a *Weltanschauung* that opportunistically ransacks various philosophies of useful concepts and creates an idealistic philosophy that contains nationalism, and class collaboration.
5. This *Weltanschauung* provides the ideological support for war, which is the chief way in which fascism may continually maintain intense emotional response and control them without changing property-relations
6. War, too, is aestheticized—but destruction and suffering are not merely edited out, as in bourgeois democracy, but glorified. In the course of the aestheticization of war, the technology of war is frequently aestheticized as well
7. Both bourgeois democracy and fascism rely on terrorism, but fascism is more terrorist than bourgeois democracy. The freedoms the proletariat (however temporarily) are allowed to exert are larger in bourgeois democracy
8. Fascism and bourgeois democracy are theoretical extremes or archetypes: all bourgeois regimes have elements of both types. The seeds of fascism are in bourgeois democracy: nevertheless, the two can be distinguished.
9. Bourgeois democracy is unstable, and as the bourgeois regime faces a crisis or its overthrow, the bourgeoisie will turn to fascism in order to block the emergence of a successful revolutionary movement
10. Fascism relies on the exploitation of “microfascisms” (the repression and distortion of desiring-production by units and institutions such as the nuclear family) among the populace to create docile subjects that desire their own repression.

## 4.2 Theodor Adorno

Foremost among those providing a theoretical analysis of fascism is Theodor W. Adorno. Following Pollock (1941), Adorno (along with Max Horkheimer) hold that Nazism relied on the unification of State and Kapital (state monopoly capitalism) which suspended the prime contradiction of capitalism: between the material productive forces of society and the relations of production. The same structures, they held, had produced the *culture industry* in liberal democracies (analysed in Adorno and Horkheimer (1947) and Adorno (1951)), which mass-produced popular culture like a factory mass-produces goods, and in doing so manipulated mass society into complacency. The culture industry takes over the power of imagination and critical thought, and, through its powers of assimilation, renders any subversion impossible, producing a very similar result to fascism (and thus allowing us to better understand fascism). In Adorno et al. (1950), fascism was identified with a personality type (measured through the F-scale) with the following characteristics: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception (resistance to subjectivity, self-criticism, and imagination), superstition, “toughness”, and “religion

and ethics” (stereotypy, exaggerated concerns about sex). This personality was accounted for psychologically as a result of punitive parenting, leading to a situation where children feel anger towards their parents, yet out of fear of disapproval identify with and idolize authority figures—and this was also supposedly rooted in suppressed homosexuality, which again became a hostility towards the father, suppressed by castration anxiety. In Adorno (1982), building off of the work of Erich Fromm, Adorno identifies the authoritarian personality with sadomasochism as well as narcissism, noting however that similar results were produced by the culture industry. All of this is identified with the petty-bourgeoisie. Adorno’s theory will be discussed in more detail below, when discussing Alberto Toscano’s “theses on late fascism”.

It must be noted that the merger of State and Kapital does not necessarily mean Keynesian-style corporatism, which it has traditionally been associated with and as Adorno (or at least, the most common reading of Adorno) assumes. Indeed, Nazi Germany’s economic policies more closely resembled neoliberalism than European social-democracy or the New Deal, as noted in Chaudhary and Chappe (2017): for instance Nazism invented privatisation (indeed, coining the German word *Reprivatisierung*) in an age of widespread nationalisation, putting the welfare-state of the Weimar era under private control. As noted by Chaudhary and Chappe (2017), this included even the cult of the *entrepreneur*:

Everyone (that is everyone *included* within the national-racial community) was to fall in line or develop themselves through *Führerprinzip* into autonomous self-starters, entrepreneurs, and pioneers of the national spirit in whatever sector they worked. Even as a rump state maintained the appearance of a heavy bureaucracy, with a great deal of actual organization still left to technocrats, industry was given wide berth. Society was dominated by myriad (in the parlance of our time) “thought-leaders” with overlapping and competing fiefdoms. The party itself maintained personnel connections within nearly every sector, and its own areas of control, particularly over racial questions — the sine qua non of Nazism. A deal was struck whereby the armed forces, still bruised and feeling “betrayed” by German surrender from World War I, came to an internal balance of powers agreement. Hitler was in charge, to be sure, but only through a constant negotiation between these sectors and their own mini-sovereignties. And even Hitler wasn’t the sovereign decision maker both his fervent supporters and adamant critics wanted him to be; Hitler’s office was more of a clearinghouse, often receiving conflicting positions in, sometimes sending conflicting positions out to be resolved by some other, smaller leader elsewhere. Certainly, the *Führer* was a dictator, but he was first among many, neither the striding colossus of Nazi propagandists nor the all-powerful, mini-mustachioed evil of moralistic Western popular culture.

It’s noted that Hitler only achieved power due to the lobbying efforts of both businessmen and the nationalist base of the Nazis to Hindenburg. Following Neumann, Chaudhary and Chappe (2017) notes that a better metaphor than the traditional “Leviathan” would be “Behemoth”, deriving from Hobbes’ own study of the rule of England under Cromwell: a “diffuse sovereignty”. In Nazi Germany, labor regulations were scrapped, but quality controls and quotas were added on the advice of larger firms so as to entrench monopoly

and shore up profit rates; the only restriction on profit until the war (when it, too, was removed) “was a 1934 rate cap of six to eight percent on dividends and even then, the surplus beyond this was merely redirected into short-term government bonds which would pay out against the taxes owed by the firm. But, as Neumann noted of profits in the Nazi-era, “profits are not identical with dividends. Profits are, above all, salaries, bonuses, commissions for special services, over-valuated patents, licenses, connections, and good will.”” Much like the current USA (and unlike social democracies or the Soviet Union), all of this was reflected in measures of income inequality, which skyrocketed both in the Nazi era and in the neoliberal era. This phenomenon is explained as the diffusion of governance such that it is partially assumed by corporations—as mentioned above, this phenomenon can be seen in platform capitalism, itself deeply tied to neo-reaction. The parallels extend even to the expansion and militarization of police, occurring both in the Nazi era and in the neoliberal era.

### 4.3 Alberto Toscano

Toscano (2017) has developed several “preliminary theses on late fascism”:

#### Preliminary Theses on Late Fascism

Thesis 1 (after Bloch): late fascism is bereft of non-contemporaneity or non-synchronousness – except for the non-synchronousness of the synchronous, the nostalgia for a post-utopian industrial modernity;

T1 Cor. 1 (after Bataille): fascism today is very weak on the heterogeneous surplus necessary to reproduce capitalist homogeneity, both as the “sovereign” (or imperative) level, and that of the “base” (whether lumpen excess or unconscious drives);

T1 Cor. 2 (after Pasolini): the new fascism is a fascism of homogenisation masquerading as the *jouissance* of difference;

T2 (after Freud and Adorno): the psychic structure of fascism operates through a form of mass narcissism;

T3 (after Adorno): late fascism operates through a performance of fanaticism devoid of inner conviction, though its “phoniness” does nothing to lessen its violence;

T4 (after Adorno): (late) fascism is a conservative politics of antagonistic reproduction;

T5 (after Banaji-Sartre): (late) fascism is not the politics of a class, a group or a mass, but of a manipulated series;

T6: the racialized signifier of class functions in the production and reception of late fascism as a spectre, a screen and a supplement – of the racism which is in turn a necessary supplement of nationalism (a minimal definition of fascism being the affirmation of the supplement, and its more or less open transmutation into a key ingredient of the nation-state);

T7: late fascism is driven by a desire for the state and a hatred of government;

T8: late fascism reacts against what is already a liberal reaction, it is not primarily counter-revolutionary;

T9: late fascism is not consolidated by a ruling class effort to use the autonomy of the political to deal with an external limit of capital but one of the offshoots of an endogenous protracted crisis of legitimacy of capital, in which the political is autonomous more at the level of fantasy than function;

T10: late fascism is a symptom of the toxic obsolescence of the modern figure of the political, namely a “national and social state” in which citizenship is organised across axes of ethno-racial and gender identity, and articulated to labour.

What does this mean? Let us unpack. Fascism in its *locus classicus*, according to Toscano, had movement and a concept of utopia, reacting to a revolutionary movement, associating this with Ernst Bloch’s concept of *non-contemporaneity* and Georges Bataille’s concept of *heterogeneity* (“that which is incommensurable with the orderly self-reproduction of capitalist order, whether from below as mass excess or from above as unaccountable sovereignty”). For Bloch, “the *socius* is criss-crossed by plural temporalities; the class structure of modern society is shadowed by multiple cultural and historical times that do not exist synchronously.” This is a superstructural form of uneven development, which, according to Bloch, was exploited by the Nazis:

The infringement of ‘interest slavery’ (*Zinsknechtschaft*) is believed in, as if this were the economy of 1500; superstructures that seemed long overturned right themselves again and stand still in today’s world as whole medieval city scenes. Here is the Tavern of the Nordic Blood, there the castle of the Hitler duke, yonder the Church of the German Reich, an earth church, in which even the city people can feel themselves to be fruits of the German earth and honor the earth as something holy, as the confessio of German heroes and German history[...]Peasants sometimes still believe in witches and exorcists, but not nearly as frequently and as strongly as a large class of urbanites believe in ghostly Jews and the new Baldur. The peasants sometimes still read the so-called Sixth and Seventh Books of Moses, a sensational tract about diseases of animals and the forces and secrets of nature; but half the middle class believes in the Elders of Zion, in Jewish snares and the omnipresence of Freemason symbols and in the galvanic powers of German blood and the German land.

*Non-contemporaneity*, or *non-synchronousness* refers to the re-emergence of “superstructures that seemed long overturned” in the fears and desires of people under modernity—“non-synchronous people” (identified as peasants, petty-bourgeois, aristocrats, and the lumpenproletariat) whose atavistic beliefs do not match with socialist politics, are thus quick to join reactionary movements. Being out-of-sync leads to so-called “pent-up anger”, exploitable only by reactionaries: a “swindle of fulfillment”. Yet Toscano notes that in “late fascism” (his term for the extreme right of the early 21st century), there is no pre-capitalist past longed for due to a supposed “waning of historicity”, and thus no “non-synchronousness”: nostalgia is instead held for the post-war period—a “nostalgia for synchronicity” (through Bifo, he also terms this a “national or racial Fordism”), for “a post-utopian industrial modernity”. Here we must pause to level some criticism: while this could largely be applied to much of the far right’s base, many (including some of its



most ardent ideologists) have returned indeed to longing for a “pure” “Nordic” past, either to the Viking era (this is especially pronounced in the neopagan community) or to the Crusader era (see for instance the resurgence of the slogan “Deus Vult” and frequent return to “traditionalist Catholicism”), and have revived medieval antisemitism just like their Nazi antecedents (though despite their recycling of a Crusader slogan, their Islamophobia generally lacks reference to its medieval precursor). Toscano then claims that, as a corollary (and due to the lack of a revolutionary movement), late fascism lacks heterogeneous surplus “except in the degraded vestigial form of what we could call, by analogy with the psychoanalytic notion of the ‘obscene father’, the ‘obscene leader’.” Toscano takes as evidence the supposed lack of a mass movement of late fascism: while it is true that contemporary fascism cannot properly be considered a *mass movement*, there must be a caveat that this is not because *no* movement exists but rather that the ideologists of late fascism, the propagandists and foot-soldiers, are still a small part of the populace: as can be seen by their actions, a movement certainly exists. Toscano’s second corollary to his first thesis follows Pier Paolo Pasolini’s theorizing on the difference between fascism and neo-fascism during the “Years of Lead” in Italy: the old fascism in Italy didn’t truly change the lifeways of the peasantry, but neo-fascism emerges during the period of real subsumption and the death of all utopian hopes based in the past.

Having dealt with Thesis 1 and its corollaries, we move to Toscano’s handling of Freud and Adorno. Toscano specifically points to Freud’s *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse* as a reference point for both Bataille and Adorno, and focuses on Adorno’s essay Adorno (1982) as key to his theory of fascism, as done above. Drawing on Löwenthal and Guterman’s portrait of the hypothetical American fascist instigator in *The Prophets of Deceit* as one with an ambiguous, slippery persona who takes the core grievances of the masses and magnifies the irrational elements while diminishing what would actually challenge capitalism, Adorno investigates the psychology of fascism, concluding that fascism relies “on the contradiction between the self-preserving *conatus* of the ego and his constantly frustrated desires”, resulting in mass narcissism, only resolvable through idealizing the leader, thus displacing narcissism from the self—yet the leader appears as “ham actor” or “asocial psychopath”, not a “loving father” because he belongs to the masses (a “great little man” lacking in “sovereign sublimity”) and thus understands how to manipulate them: “he too is a product of a mass culture that drains autonomy and spontaneity of their meaning”. Thus, Toscano concludes that fascism according to Adorno is “a kind of *conservative politics of antagonistic reproduction*, the reproduction of some against others, and at the limit a reproduction premised on their non-reproduction or elimination”. He then notes that fascism in power is “phoney”, though not less dangerous; a hollow performance—thus the abandonment of the early core “true believer” fascists of the avant-garde, such as the futurists in Italy or the Strasserites in Germany—that relies on a “fictitious unity”. This leads Toscano to discuss Jairus Banaji’s reflection on fascism in India, which rely on Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of “manipulated seriality”: an “other-directed mass that never “fuses” into a group, a mass which must produce macro-effects at the bidding of the group “other-directing” it, while all the while remaining dispersed” (a reterritorialized war-machine?)—the agent of the pogrom, which, according to Banaji, is at the heart of fascism. Almost off-handedly, Toscano notes: “That Sartre saw seriality as crucial to the very constitution of the modern state and its practices of sovereignty, also suggests that the borders between fascist and non-fascist other-direction may be more porous than liberal common sense suggests.”.

#### 4.4 Robert Paxton

Paxton (2004) envisions fascism as a sort of 20th century politics which would ally variously with liberals and conservatives against the Left, having five stages:

1. Intellectual exploration of fascism, where there is mass disillusionment with existing institutions that is funneled into questions of national vigor, leading to the building of fascist movements
2. Rooting in power, where fascist movements, built up in the previous stage, become a regular presence in their country's politics, aided by deadlock and political polarization
3. Arrival to power, where conservatives and reactionaries invite fascists into power to quell Leftist opposition
4. Exercise of power, where fascists control the state, nominally (at least) in balance with the police, the businessmen, and whatever vestiges may remain of the feudal elite including the clergy
5. Radicalization or entropy, where fascists increasingly radicalize (Nazi Germany) or metamorphose into a traditional dictatorial state (Francoist Spain, Fascist Italy)

He then defines fascism as following:

A form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion

While this is a neat description of the historical evolution of 20th century fascism—its emergence in crisis through a focus on “renewing national vigor”, its entrance into government as coalition partners of more established conservatives, its takeover, and then its fate—it is hard to show how this is useful to us, who are already in the middle of an electoral surge of the far-right. The definition Paxton gives is more useful: it correctly identifies the *fear of humiliation* at the root of fascism.

#### 4.5 Umberto Eco

Umberto Eco, too, maintained that the best way to describe fascism was through a list of features—indeed, he claimed it was impossible to explain fascism in an organized theoretical way. In Eco (1995), he lists the following fourteen points:

1. The Cult of Tradition: syncretism of various traditions, regardless of contradictions, and the assertion that all truth is found in tradition, with no new learning possible except interpretation and refinement

2. The Rejection of Modernism: a rejection of rationalism and the Enlightenment as degeneration—which, however, is to be distinguished from a rejection of technology, as fascists usually boast over industrial production
3. The Cult of Action for Action's Sake: action as a value in and of itself, which should be taken without reflection or examination, which corrupt it. This is connected with anti-intellectualism
4. Disagreement is Treason: Fascism refuses intellectual discourse and attacks critical reasoning, because they both expose the contradictions required for any fascist ideology
5. Fear of Difference: Fascism relies on exploiting fear of difference
6. Appeal to a Frustrated Middle Class: the traditional analysis of fascism's class-base as the petty-bourgeoisie, feeling threatened both from above and from below
7. Obsession with a Plot: Fascism takes the fear of difference and elaborates it into a plot, combined with appeals to a fear of disloyalty from marginalised elements of society
8. The Enemy is Too Strong and Too Weak: Fascism casts its enemies as both incredibly strong (to brew up resentment and humiliation) and incredibly weak (to prove their inability to rule and decadence—and thus, their illegitimacy)
9. Pacifism is Trafficking With the Enemy: Fascism relies on a state of everlasting war, and thus those who do not fight must be cast as enemies
10. Contempt for the Weak: a form of elitism which is in tension with populism to form what Eco calls *popular elitism*: every member of society is considered superior to the out-group simply by being a member of the in-group, but the society is still structured hierarchally, so each group despises its inferiors
11. Everybody is Educated to Become a Hero: a cult of heroism is inculcated, leading to a cult of death—the populace wishes to become a populace of heroes, and find the culmination of heroism in heroic death. To quote Eco, “The Ur-Fascist hero is impatient to die. In his impatience, he more frequently sends other people to death.”
12. Machismo: It's difficult to maintain eternal war and heroism, so this is displaced onto sex, where it becomes *machismo*, leading to a brutal embrace of the most chauvinist excesses of what I'd call cis-hetero-patriarchal ideology. Of course, sex is still difficult, so it is further displaced upon weapons
13. Selective Populism: The People are conceived of as a whole, with a single, common will, to be interpreted (though it is dictated) by the dictator. This is used to delegitimize parliamentary institutions, which, it is claimed, no longer represent this single, common will

14. “Newspeak”: in order to impair critical reasoning, Eco claims, fascism relies on limiting discourse to a small vocabulary and elementary syntax.

Some criteria here may indeed be useful; others less so. In particular, point 14 relies on linguistic determinism, an idea both empirically unsupported and politically reactionary. We may summarize, then, the following superstructural elements of fascism as described by Eco: populist traditionalism which appeals to a strongman figure, a rejection of the Enlightenment, disagreement, critical reasoning, and pacifism; conspiracy theories, “the enemy is too strong and too weak”, and a cult of heroes and machismo which relies on contempt for the weak. This focus on machismo, contempt for the weak, &c should point to the importance of a *fear of humiliation* in fascist ideology—it underlies machismo (which itself underlies the contempt for the weak and the rejection of the Enlightenment, disagreement, critical reasoning, and pacifism) as well as the idealization of a strongman (who surely cannot be humiliated), conspiracy theories and “the enemy is too strong and too weak” (the only acceptable explanation, given the fear of humiliation, of a current lack of dominance). What is this *fear of humiliation* based on? The answer, interestingly enough, lies in the work of Nick Land as a youth.

#### 4.6 Young Nick Land

Despite Nick Land’s later turn to fascism, his early works provide a fascinating account of fascism, particularly Land (1988). For Land, fascism originates from the fundamental contradictions of a patrilineal kinship system (the kinship system being precisely what organizes race and gender): the contradiction between “synthesis” (“expansionary social and economic development”: trade, whose earliest form is the exogamy, the trade of women and thus the prohibition of incest; surplus thus requires a confrontation with alterity) and “abstract masculine subjectivity” (the combination of the formal logic of identity—which is inherently xenophobic—and genealogical logic of patrilineality). Synthesis destabilizes patrilineality and identity, and so to preserve the latter the former must be either repressed or controlled (“inhibited”); in addition, the necessity of alterity in the generation of surplus means that the other must be dominated, not fully absorbed. In the Middle Ages, synthesis was repressed; in capitalism, it is inhibited: trade is isolated from kinship, such that synthesis through trade is allowed while kinship is exogamic at a familial but endogamic at a national level; the preservation of identity means the preservation of xenophobia, but at a national level. Lévi-Strauss’s discussion of “dual organization” provides a model for this: synthesis is provided rules and an identity (through myths based around binary opposition) and limited to reciprocal exchange of women and “rich food” between two patrilineal exogamies, thus preserving alterity only in a residual form. The nation-state is the result, as is the world-system which combines the desire for political distance between the First and Third Worlds and the necessary economic connections between them, trading labor from the Third World for political instability to the Third World. This system is seen in microcosm in apartheid South Africa. Fascism is defined here as “a militant activism rooted in the inhibitory and exclusive dimensions of a metropolitanism [chauvinism of the metropole]” Land (1988, 92). The *fear of humiliation* earlier described in the engagement with Umberto Eco can be contextualized here: it is a fear of the annihilation of patriarchy by synthesis, a fear that trade and kinship can no longer be isolated from each other, a fear of cuckoldry—the loss of women from the endogamic structure of the Nation.

#### 4.7 Biopolitical perspectives: Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Achille Mbembe, and Alexander Weheliye

In Foucault (1975-6), Foucault discusses fascism in the context of biopower, biopower being the way in which bodies are regulated and populations are controlled. In ancient times, this was the sovereign's right to kill ("let live or make die", which is inherently individualized); in the modern era, the rule is now supplemented (not replaced) by "foster life or let die" through institutions like medicine (inherently massifying, dealing with populations as opposed to individual bodies): Foucault mentions attempts to change birth rates or life expectancy. He thus distinguishes "two series: the body-organism-discipline-institutions series and the population-biological processes-regulatory-mechanisms-State. An organic institutional set, or the organo-discipline of the institution, if you like, and, on the other hand, a biological and Statist set, or bioregulation by the State". Biopower inscribes racism "in the mechanisms of the State [...] as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States". Racism, according to Foucault is "primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die"—but it also "has a second function":

Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies". But racism does make the relationship of war—"If you want to live, the other must die"—function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I—as species rather than individual—can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate". The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.

Thus, racism appears for Foucault to be the base of the right to kill (which, he is careful to note, does not necessarily mean direct murder but also indirect killing) in modern society, allowing it to exercise that right without reverting to ancient sovereignty—and so, too, the power of life and death (of sovereignty, in Foucault's notion) must become racist if it "wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization". He summarizes: "racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality". Foucault finally moves to discuss Nazism in particular: Nazism had a maximum

of disciplinary power and biopower and also unleashed “the old sovereign right to take life”—indeed, “ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbors, if only because the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with”. Foucault then claims, more speculatively, that because of the value attached to risking one’s life (“being exposed to total destruction”) the *true* objective of Nazism included both “the destruction of other races” as one aspect and “to expose its own race to the absolute and universal threat of death” as the other: “the only way it [the “Aryans”] could truly constitute itself as a superior race and bring about its definitive regeneration”. Thus, for Foucault, Nazism has a suicidal impulse contained in its effort to prove itself; and Foucault claims that all states—and all socialisms—contain the seeds of fascism.

Giorgio Agamben’s thought since Agamben (1995) can be seen as an attempt to provide a more sophisticated theoretical lineage (that of German philosophy—along with Roman law and Aristotle’s politics—as opposed to French theory) and venerate upon an essentially Foucauldian theory of biopower. Agamben begins with a concept of Roman law which has become the common term for his thought: *homo sacer* (sacred man). A *homo sacer* was one who had committed a certain crime; the punishment was to lose citizenship and be banned from society—in addition, a *homo sacer* could be legally killed, but not sacrificed ritually (thus *sacer*, which had a broader meaning than the modern sacred). The *homo sacer* was thus excluded from law, yet paradoxically included—“under its spell”. Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s (Carl Schmitt being the “crown jurist of the Third Reich”) definition of the sovereign as the one who decides on the state of exception (*Ausnahmenzustand*, originating in Roman *iustitium*) where law is suspended yet remains (thus standing both inside and outside law), Agamben portrays the *homo sacer* as a mirror of the sovereign. Agamben draws a distinction between two concepts of life: “bare life” (*zōē*, bodies) and “political life” or “qualified life” (*bios*, citizens). *Homo sacer* is the device by which citizens are reduced to bodies, qualified life to bare life, *bios* to *zōē*, thus allowing the State to define *zōē* and *bios*—indeed, drawing upon Aristotle, the State must exclude *zōē* (to separate it from *bios*) but also simultaneously include it (so that it may be transformed into *bios*). This means that sovereignty is the power to constitute the political body by exclusion, though it relies on that which is excluded for its existence: biopower in a Foucauldian sense thus emerges as central to sovereignty from the ancient time to today. Agamben then, in Agamben (2003) moves to discuss the state of exception itself (the indefinite suspension of law), which allows the suspension or elimination of rights in the course of investing a core (whether a person, branch of government, or government) with greater authority. He defines “totalitarianism” (a bourgeois category, but one which we can recognize as a term including “fascism”) as the use of the state of exception to wage war against various populations, noting that Hitler never eliminated the Weimar Constitution, only suspended it from the Reichstag Fire Decree of 1933 to his death. It’s important to note that this was written in 2003: what is under discussion in this book is the designation of “enemy combatants” (and thus the legitimation of torture) and the prison at Guantánamo Bay. Agamben then distinguishes *potesitas* (social in origin) from *auctoritas* (personal, what is “less than an order and more than an advice”), associating the latter with the Weberian concept of charismatic leadership. The sovereign with *auctoritas* fuses public and private life; *auctoritas* is associated with biopolitics/biopower and opposed to law, which is associated with *potesitas*. For Agamben (following Arendt), the figure of the *Duce* or *Führer*

derives from the Roman *auctoritas principis*, the basis, according to the *Res Gestae*, for the power of the *princeps*.

In Mbembe (2003), Achille Mbembe develops from the concept of biopolitics, as well as from the theories of Agamben, a concept of *necropolitics*, beginning with the now-familiar assertion tying sovereignty to the right of life and death: “to kill or to allow to live constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental attributes”. As Agamben earlier asserts, this makes biopower fundamental to sovereignty. Breaking from Agamben, Mbembe holds that the contemporary concept of sovereignty emerges with modernity, not from Aristotle. Mbembe also criticises the common definition of politics as “a project of autonomy and the achieving of agreement among a collectivity through communication and recognition” (deriving from a reason/unreason distinction), and of sovereignty as “a twofold process of *self-institution* and *self-limitation* (fixing one’s own limits for oneself)” and the exercise of sovereignty as “society’s capacity for self-creation through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and imaginary significations”, focusing instead on “those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but *the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations*” (emphasis his). He assesses Hegel’s and Bataille’s theories of sovereignty, noting the importance of an encounter with death, risking death, and the power to kill. Mbembe then moves to biopower as well as to Schmittian themes raised earlier by Agamben, asking “What is the relationship between politics and death in those systems that can function only in a state of emergency?”. After reviewing Foucault’s discussion of biopower, race, sovereignty, and Nazism (as narrated above), noting the common perception that the annihilation of the distinction between politics and war was unique to Nazism, Mbembe discusses critiques of modernity that rely on the modern idea of sovereignty relying on “the will and capacity to kill in order to live”, contending instead that the ties between reason, modernity, and terror have many roots. Mbembe moves to assert that slavery is perhaps the first instance of modern biopolitics, and the plantation the state of exception, noting that slavery “results from a triple loss: loss of a “home,” loss of rights over his or her body, and loss of political status. This triple loss is identical with absolute domination, natal alienation, and social death (expulsion from humanity altogether)”. However, the slave must be kept alive to extract labor and to have value as property. The condition of slavery is thus described as “death-in-life”: “The slave is therefore kept alive but in a *state of injury*, in a phantom-like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity” (emphasis Mbembe’s). The slave is dehumanized and “the power over the life of another takes the form of commerce”. Yet despite this, Mbembe notes that the slave still “maintains alternative perspectives toward time, work, and self”, “is able to draw almost any object, instrument, language, or gesture into a performance and then stylize it”, and “is able to demonstrate the protean capabilities of the human bond through music and the very body that was supposedly possessed by another”.

From this, Mbembe moves to colonialism and apartheid, which are not only the state of exception and biopower, but also the *state of siege* (another Schmittian concept, which Mbembe will later characterise as “a military institution. It allows a modality of killing that does not distinguish between the external and internal enemy. Entire populations are the target of the sovereign”), and like slavery, are organized around race. Mbembe notes that the colony is “the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law (*ab legibus solutus*) and where “peace” is more likely to take on the

face of a “war without end.”” The European juridical order (*Ius publicum*) relied on the understanding that all states were juridically equal (in particular, had an equal right to wage war—to take life) which meant understanding the state’s function of killing (in and only in its own borders, with exclusive claim to that land) and which lead to the attempt to “civilize” war. The juridical order also relied on a distinction between Europe and the rest of the world in order to determine its own jurisdiction. The *Ius publicum* regulates wars within it: “a legitimate war is, to a large extent, a war conducted by one state against another, or, more precisely, a war between “civilized” states”. Colonies remain outside the jurisdiction of the *Ius publicum*: the colonized are “savages” without a state or army (wars are not between “regular armies”), without distinction between “combatants and noncombatants, or again between an “enemy” and a “criminal””. Thus, peace is impossible in the colony, which becomes a place of perpetual war against the people, and so it is a place where law is indefinitely suspended: it is itself a state of exception and a state of siege, and the colonized (“savage life”) are for the colonizer “just another form of *animal life*, a horrifying experience, something alien beyond imagination or comprehension”, for the colonizer entirely subhuman (here Mbembe quotes Arendt) “so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder”. Mbembe emphasizes how space (territorialization) is essential to sovereignty in the colony, with apartheid South Africa as his case study: “the *township* was the structural form and the *homelands* became the reserves (rural bases) whereby the flow of migrant labor could be regulated and African urbanization held in check [...] the township was a peculiar spatial institution scientifically planned for the purposes of control”. He notes that for Fanon, colonialism begins with the division of space. Mbembe comes to the conclusion that “in this case, sovereignty means the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is *disposable* and who is not” (this serves as a useful definition of necropower).

Mbembe distinguishes late modern colonies from early modern colonies through the former’s “combining of the disciplinary, the biopolitical, and the necropolitical”, and so moves to another case: Palestine. He notes that by expanding settlements and separating them from the rest of the land the Palestinian territory is fragmented, dividing and detaining Palestinians in “a web of intricate internal borders and various isolated cells”. Citing Eyal Weizman (who calls this the “politics of verticality”), Mbembe calls sovereignty with this sort of politics “vertical sovereignty”, where “colonial occupation operates through schemes of over- and underpasses, a separation of the airspace from the ground”, and where the settlements also become strategic centres for surveillance. Key here is the creation of bypasses which separate the road systems of Israel and Palestine, allowing for the mobility of Israelis alongside the confinement of Palestinians. He then emphasizes the *bulldozing* of Palestinian communities and the infrastructure that supports them (*infrastructural warfare*). The combination of these produce a *state of siege* (“The besieged villages and towns are sealed off and cut off from the world. Daily life is militarized. Freedom is given to local military commanders to use their discretion as to when and whom to shoot. Movement between the territorial cells requires formal permits. Local civil institutions are systematically destroyed. The besieged population is deprived of their means of income. Invisible killing is added to outright executions.”). Mbembe also notes that the mobility of modern armies (and the consequent use of hit-and-run tactics with “overwhelming force”) renders them more similar to nomadic raiders than to traditional standing armies. The emergence (or re-emergence, consider the *Freikorps* in post-Great War eastern Eu-



rope) of militias, mercenaries, and privateers in Africa is tied by Mbembe to Deleuze's *war machine*. The increasing instability of money since the 1980s in Africa (tied to these war-machines) has led to the creation of *enclave economies* focused on resource extraction, which Mbembe characterizes as "privileged spaces of war and death". Mbembe connects this to a new form of governmentality "that consists in the *management of the multitudes*", characterised by "brutal attempts to immobilize and spatially fix whole categories of people or, paradoxically, to unleash them, to force them to scatter over broad areas no longer contained by the boundaries of a territorial state [...] populations are then disaggregated into rebels, child soldiers, victims or refugees, or civilians incapacitated by mutilation or simply massacred on the model of ancient sacrifices, while the "survivors," after a horrible exodus, are confined in camps and zones of exception". He distinguishes this from the "colonial *commandement*" by the intensification of "technologies of destruction": "If power still depends on tight control over bodies (or on concentrating them in camps), the new technologies of destruction are less concerned with inscribing bodies within disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them, when the time comes, within the order of the maximal economy now represented by the "massacre.""

Traditional biopolitical perspectives have come under significant criticism in Alexander Weheliye's *Weheliye* (2014) for their inattention to race. Not only does Foucault plagiarize George Jackson's *Soledad Brother* in *Discipline and Punish* (it is known that he read the former in the *Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons*, a prison-abolitionist study group he founded), his overly broad definition of race (and glorification of hybridity as solution—one might see something similar in Deleuze and Guattari, or in early Land's discussion of synthesis, which Weheliye notes "leave the door open for the naturalization of this category", when it is, as quoted in Weheliye "a political category that has been disguised as a biological one") weakens his ability to understand racism. However, the brunt of Weheliye's criticism is aimed at Agamben. Weheliye questions Agamben's use of Nazi concentration camps as the *locus classicus* of *homo sacer*, noting that not only did Nazi concentration camps have many antecedents which were arguably more central to settler-colonialism and high imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries, but that plantation slavery is an even better choice for a *locus classicus* both for its expansive history (as opposed to concentration camps, which usually formed in wartime) and for its centrality to capitalism. Weheliye then criticises Agamben's use of the "Muselmann" (a term for concentration camp inmates, derived from a racial slur against Muslims, who, in the words of Weheliye "resembled phlegmatic but still living corpses") as the unique limit-case of bare life, noting that it does not exceed race but serves as yet another example of race (Weheliye, relying on testimony, later demystifies the phenomenon of the Muselmann, noting that it wasn't an "inert status" but a "protracted process" which people moved in and out of, and Muselmänner, which made up a large percentage of concentration camp inmates, depending on the year, were not shunned by other concentration camp inmates—for Weheliye, Agamben's refusal to engage with testimony shows that "he cannot conceive of the Muselmänner as actual, complicated, breathing, living, ravenous, and desiring beings"). Weheliye then criticises Agamben's use of Walter Benjamin, arguing that it is illegitimate to assimilate Benjamin's thoughts to those of Carl Schmitt, demonstrating that Benjamin (in Benjamin (1921)) criticizes the tie between life and law (noting that for Benjamin bare life "marks the precise moment in which "the rule of law over the living ceases") which Agamben would later make by connecting bare life and the state of exception and can root the elimination of law and the

State in revolutionary violence (through a general strike) which Agamben and Schmitt must deny. Weheliye then shows that the contrast that Agamben attempts to draw between “abnormal” martial law and “normal” penal law is false, for torture is ever present in the prison system. For Weheliye, *homo sacerization* is just another term for *racialization* (which Weheliye describes as “a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man, because its law-like operations are yoked to species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line—instituted by cultural laws so as to register in human neural networks—that clearly distinguishes the good life/life/fully-human from the bad/death/not-quite-human” and later as “group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death”; Weheliye, following Spillers (1987), replaces *homo sacer* with *pornotroping*, Spillers’ concept of, in Weheliye’s words, “the enactment of black suffering for a shocked and titillated audience”. Weheliye thus follows Reich, Adorno, Marcuse, Sontag et cetera in noting fascism’s erotic element and ties to sadomasochism, which is more visible in current depictions of slavery because of the oscillating subhuman/hyperhuman in current depictions of slaves. Agamben, according to Weheliye, abstracts sexuality and locates *homo sacer* “on the continent of man” (here Weheliye quotes Benjamin) through the relationship with “sovereignty, shame, and profanation”. Pornotroping interpellates (creates-through-hailing) the flesh and is thus a racializing assemblage. Weheliye also notes that “In the end, while the extremity of becoming-Muselmann should by no means be denied, we do well to recall that racism, whether in the colony, the concentration camp, the plantation, the prison, in Guantanamo Bay, or on Ellis Island exhibits no dire need for a legal state of exception, although it has a hard time refusing it when offered as a fringe benefit”. After Weheliye analyses biopolitics and bare life theories (and criticises Agamben’s Schmittian theories and distortion of Benjamin), he moves towards the project of Sylvia Wynter (“the destruction of the genre; with the displacement of the genre of the human of ‘Man’”, where “Man” is glossed by Weheliye as representing “the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the heteromasculine, white, propertied, and liberal subject that renders all who do not conform to these characteristics as exploitable nonhumans”) and Hortense Spillers’ challenge (“to claim the monstrosity of the flesh as a site for freedom beyond the world of Man”), noting that “to banish these articulations [the testimony of the former Muselmann Włodzimierz Borkowski, the slave narrative of Mary Prince, and C.L.R. James’ account of the Haitian Revolution] of freedom and/or pleasure into exile in the precinct of inhumanity or prelanguage, as Agamben and others do, not only denies the possibility of life in extreme circumstances but also leaves intact the ruling definition of the human as Man”. Bare life and biopolitics discourse stands accused of foreclosing the political messianism (which, according to Weheliye, characterizes Marx, Du Bois, and Benjamin) tied to the tradition of the oppressed and necessary for freedom. Weheliye calls his politics *habeas viscus*, which “points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed”.

#### 4.7.1 The Colonial and Imperial Precursors of Fascism

As Césaire (1950) among others notes, the mechanisms used by fascism have their prototypes and predecessors in the methods used in settler-colonialism and high imperialism. In

particular, American race law was a vital influence on Nazism, as shown in Whitman (2017) among others. The Nuremberg Laws were explicitly inspired by American racial legislation (this is established not only through Hitler's frequent references to America—and indeed to the Western genre, where *Generalplan Ost* is compared to manifest destiny—in *Mein Kampf* among other places but also in a meeting of German lawyers in 1934 which used American race law to draft prototypes of the Nuremberg Laws): American race law showed that race could become a legal reality without any objective scientific basis being necessary (indeed, that law could help *define* race), the Nuremberg Laws' anti-miscegenation laws were explicitly derived from American anti-miscegenation laws, the Nuremberg Laws' definition of race was actually based on the *least restrictive* American laws defining race (the one-drop rule was seen as too extreme even by Nazis—indeed, the Prussian Memorandum explicitly stated that Jim Crow laws were seen by the Nazis, at least in the early 1930s, as too extreme), California's eugenics program was the most advanced yet developed (and consequently an inspiration for the Nazi eugenics programs leading to the Holocaust), the Cable Act of 1922 inspired the Nazis' use of marital status in determining race, et cetera. One must also remember, following Weheliye (2014), the history of the concentration camps in the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua people at the hands of the German Empire in 1907, the American camps in Batangas in the Philippine-American war in 1901, the British camps in the Boer War in 1900, the Spanish concentration camps in Cuba in 1895, the “contraband camps” in the South in the US Civil War (1861–65), the US camp on Pike Island during its war with the Lakota people in 1862, and earlier US camps used on the Cherokee people during “Indian removal” in the 1830s. The total fusion of Kapital and the State is in fact a constant characteristic of colonialism: it emerges with the first colonial projects, chartered through joint-stock companies such as the East India Company, which would then come to rule territories as States. A more recent example, one which can be seen as an immediate precursor to fascism, is the Congo Free State, personally ruled by King Leopold II of Belgium but functioning as a company extracting rubber, ivory, copper, and other resources through enslaving the populace.

#### 4.8 Has There Been A Recent Fascist Rupture?

Mainstream theories of fascism generally rely on the notion of a rupture with bourgeois democracy, yet, especially with neo-fascism but also with the deep continuity between settler-colonialism, high imperialism, and fascism, this is hard to maintain.

If one holds a sudden entrance into fascism in the US in 2017, how can one treat, then, the US's existence as a settler-colony (internalizing colonial mechanisms), its consistent policy of coups in the Third World alongside racism (which, it must be emphasized, is a deadly force, not only the microaggressions typically brought to mind with the word), misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, ableism and repression of the Left at home, Johnson's and Nixon's carpet-bombing of Southeast Asia and repression of the New Left, the re-emergence of segregation beginning at least with *Milliken v. Bradley*, Ford's imposition of discipline on New York City through denial of a bailout during bankruptcy, Carter's deregulation of the airline industry (setting the stage for future policy), Reagan's more widespread deregulation, disciplining of labor, destruction of the welfare-state, and genocide through inaction on AIDS, the so-called “War on Drugs” and “War on Crime” (that is, the militarization of the police and the expansion of the (racialized) prison-industrial complex) intensified through Bush and Clinton, Bush II's PATRIOT act and legal justification

of long-standing torture programs, Obama's policy of mass-deportation and continuation of forever-wars, the increasing unification of the State and Kapital through privatization of public services, public-private partnerships, the decay of antitrust law, corporate welfare, and increasingly unrestricted bribery ("lobbying")? One must either treat "fascism" as merely "the replacement of dogwhistles with open xenophobia" or in other words, aesthetics that openly imitate earlier fascist aesthetics, in order to call one "fascist" and the other not fascist at all.

If my earlier paper had at all drawn a distinction between the US Right and the American fascist movement at its broadest, it is a distinction hinging purely on aesthetics and perhaps mass-psychology (though even in these two realms the distinction is not as clear as one might hope: consider the Reagan-era call for an AIDS-read: gay-quarantine-read: camps), not on policy. Is fascism then merely a new fashion, a haircut or a uniform? Or is fascism to be entirely blind to such things, entirely a policy—and if so, what difference is there between fascism and other forms of bourgeois society? Reducing fascism either to aesthetics and mass-psychology on the one hand or policy on the other appears thus to annul its usefulness as an analytical tool.

One useful area to try and discern a distinction would be on the use of control (as in Deleuze (1992)), associated with liberalism and "Jupiterian" reaction (as will be discussed below), and necropower, associated with fascism in its classical form and in the alt-right. Again, though, one must be careful not to draw a crude binary: no society relies purely on one or the other, and indeed they can all act in perfect harmony. Another helpful view would be to move away from the idea of a decisive rupture and towards a process by which fascism, like Sauron, reconstructs itself piece by piece in capitalist society, first through policy and then through mass-psychology, in search of the animating One Ring of state power under capitalism.

#### 4.9 Notes for a New Theory of Fascism

Let us thus create the following theory of fascism, building off the previous one:

1. Fascism is one of two forms of bourgeois rule, the other being bourgeois democracy. There are no *primary differences*, but there are *secondary differences*
2. Fascism emerges in the shadow of a failed revolution; that is, at times when bourgeois rule is weak (and/or when racist patriarchy has faced challenges), but a revolution has either failed, been betrayed by centrist, "Social Democrat" forces, or, similarly, been forestalled/delayed: in the latter case, the turn to fascism is an attempt to block a revolutionary movement from forming or gaining success.
3. Fascism in the early 21st century is simultaneously a reaction against the superstructure of neoliberal restoration and an attempt to extend the base of restoration in the wake of renewed strength of the Left and mass disillusionment with liberalism and in the wake of the threat of the erosion of the nation-state
4. Fascism transforms politics and its promise of revolutionary change into a commodity—it thusly *aestheticizes* politics, giving the masses the intensity associated with revolutionary change but maintaining an even stronger devotion to maintaining bourgeois rule and property-relations

5. In order to maintain this intensity, fascism constructs a *Weltanschauung* that opportunistically ransacks various philosophies of useful concepts and creates an idealistic philosophy that contains nationalism, and class collaboration.
6. This *Weltanschauung* provides the ideological support for war, which is the chief way in which fascism may continually maintain this intensity without changing property-relations
7. War, too, is aestheticized—but destruction and suffering are not merely edited out, as in bourgeois democracy, but glorified. In the course of the aestheticization of war, the technology of war is frequently aestheticized as well
8. Fascism is characterized by the total fusion of Kapital and State, corresponding to a desire for the State and a hatred of government
9. Fascism and bourgeois democracy are theoretical extremes or archetypes: all bourgeois regimes have elements of both types. The seeds of fascism are in bourgeois democracy: nevertheless, the two can be distinguished.
10. Bourgeois democracy is unstable, and as the bourgeois regime (and its racist patriarchy) faces a crisis or its overthrow, the bourgeoisie will turn to fascism in order to block the emergence of a successful revolutionary movement
11. Fascism relies on the exploitation of “microfascisms” (the repression and distortion of desiring-production by units and institutions such as the nuclear family) among the populace to create docile subjects that desire their own repression; it is closely tied with sadomasochism and mass narcissism.
12. Fascism relies on a *fear of humiliation* that is the *fear of the annihilation of racist patriarchy by synthesis* (with its canonical form in the fear of cuckoldry): this fear of humiliation (also analysed as sadomasochism and mass narcissism above) underlies machismo (leading to contempt for the weak, rejection of modernism, disagreement, critical reasoning, and pacifism), the idealization of a strongman, the obsession with conspiracy theories and “the enemy is too strong and too weak”
13. Fascism includes the *internalization of colonial mechanisms*, which include necropower, the fusion of Kapital and State, and pornotroping, as part of a *politics of antagonistic reproduction*; a settler-colony is thus always at least semi-fascist.
14. Fascism, especially following the Second World War, is not produced by a decisive rupture but constructs itself slowly through policy and mass-psychology

## 5 The Alt-Lite


Despite neoreaction’s claim to intellectual leadership of the alt-right, it has been sidelined to a minor tendency in terms of media attention and policy, though it retains its influence in the Neo-Byzantium of the Bay Area and Silicon Valley in particular. Largely it has been supplanted in its role as the policy pole of the alt-right by a tendency often referred to as the “alt-lite” less focused on transhumanism than on nationalism; instead

of the open call for destroying all barriers for capital accumulation, this faction speaks of “economic nationalism”. This faction has taken a leadership role due to its ties with electoral political parties, built up in Europe as the European New Right and in America through the media ecosystem of the far-right and the paleoconservative movement: the Republican Party in the US, UKIP, the Front National, Alternative für Deutschland, FPÖ, &c. The æsthetic distinction between the two is summarized in Ambedkar (2017), which constructs a chart with four quadrants. The chart is not structured like a Cartesian coordinate system: rather, it is two two-panel charts with parallel axes, one atop the other. The top chart is between the alt-right (*The Right Stuff*, *Fash the Nation*, Richard Spencer) and the alt-lite (*Breitbart*, the European New Right, the Manosphere), with its axis being the form of nationalism: the alt-right trades in overt white nationalism, the alt-lite covert white nationalism through “economic nationalism”. The bottom chart is between fascist esotericism (such as that of Julius Evola, Savitri Devi, Boyd Rice, or Douglas P.) and neo-reaction (Nick Land, Mencius Moldbug), with its axis being the form of faith: esotericists rely on traditional, established religions (or on Western occultism) while neo-reactionaries place their faith in techno-utopian fantasy. All of the strands rely on both nationalism and faith (and indeed, though the axes provide some source for in-fighting, they do not permanently sever the quadrants from another), yet what they emphasize—and the form in which it takes—helps distinguish them from each other, at least in the analysis of Ambedkar (2017). This also means they “should not be understood as antithetical; the axes are constitutive and relational, accounting for variations in nationalism and faith”.

## 6 The “Jupiterian” Ideology



### FISH HOOK THEORY



The “Jupiterian” ideology (named for Macron’s neologism which eschewed the traditional adjective *jovian*) is what has been called “left fascism” in Osterweil (2017); it too emerges from Neo-Byzantium and is perhaps closer to neo-reaction à la Moldbug than the alt-right is because it clothes itself in mainstream liberalism (by now a rotting corpse) rather than neo-Nazism. It is most prominently associated with Emmanuel Macron, Justin Trudeau, Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk; it’s spread through the *hot-takes* developed by the *Church/Industry of Jupiter* (in Adornian terms, the culture industry in the 21st century): mainstream news sites (especially editorials), liberal online news-sites, administrators in universities, and especially Twitter (ironically, the same “Cathedral” that are victims of Moldbug’s polemic). The Jupiterian ideology can be seen at work in the actions of one of

its precursors and now advocates, Bill Gates, first at destroying American public education through charter school advocacy and for the creation of the pinnacle of the neoliberal city: Belmont, Arizona, a modern fiefdom (the anti-democratic so-called “smart city”) built on the empty dreams of Neo-Byzantium (its precursors including the private police-city-states known as company towns). Consider also the increasing vogue for Minority Report-style “crime precognition” and eugenic search for “criminal genes”. Here is its description in Osterweil (2017):

As liberalism collapses, so too does the left-right divide that has marked the past century of domestic politics in the capitalist world. The political conflict of the future will not be between liberalism (or its friendlier European cousin, social democracy) and a conservatism that basically agrees with the principles of liberal democracy but wishes the police would swing their billy clubs a lot harder. Instead, the political dichotomy going forward will be between a “left” and “right” fascism. One is already ascendant, and the other is new but quickly growing. Jürgen Habermas and various other 20th century Marxists used “left fascism” as a generic slander against their ideological opponents, but I am using it to refer to something more specific: the corporatocratic libertarianism that is the counterpart of right fascism’s authoritarian ethnonationalism, forming the two sides of the same coin. When, in the wake of the imminent economic downturn, Mark Zuckerberg runs for president on the promise of universal basic income and a more “global citizen”-style American identity in 2020, he will represent this new “left” fascism: one that, unlike Trump’s, sheds the nation-state as a central concept. A truly innovative and disruptive fascism for the 21st century.

Rather than invoke *Herrenvolk* principles and citizenship based on blood and soil, these left fascists will build nations of “choice” built around brand loyalty and service use. Rather than citizens, there will be customers and consumers, CEOs and boards instead of presidents and congresses, terms of service instead of social contracts. Workers will be policed by privatized paramilitaries and live in company towns. This is, in fact, how much of early colonialism worked, with its chartered joint-stock companies running plantation microstates on opposite sides of the world. Instead of the crown, however, there will be the global market: no empire, just capital.

[...]

The nation-state has been the model for statehood for so long now that we often use the concepts interchangeably, but the left fascists of Silicon Valley have long looked at Singapore with awe and longing. The small, diverse, authoritarian city-state has created an incredibly wealthy class of managers by running the city not as a nation-state devoted to protecting or representing its citizens so much as a corporate haven for global capital flows. Silicon Valley’s “California ideology” of libertarian pseudo-anti-statism, famously analyzed and identified in the mid-nineties, has grown and expanded for decades now, as has the Valley’s material power. A world of tech-driven Singapores is already mostly built, as the idea of “global cities” has become a reality, and

capitalists spend their time and do their business from a dozen pieds-à-terre spread across the globe.

The difference between state and nation-state will become increasingly clear as a new fascist politics of total corporate sovereignty comes into view. Its romantic dreams of fully automated factories, moon colonies, and seasteads mirror the old Italian fascists' fetishization of technology, violence, and speed. Packaged with a libertarian opposition to borders and all-out wars, this left fascism will represent the new cutting edge of capitalist restructuring.

[...]

Both sides agree that the state should be used to cut wages, police the mobs, and eliminate regulatory oversight. The right fascists, the more traditional of the two, want to solve the question of class war once and for all in a final solution of blood and fire, while the left-fash imagine they can disrupt the class war away by creating much smaller and more easily controlled states and providing basic subsistence.

One side sees the people as subjects; the other, customers. The difference between a dictator-subject relationship and a business-customer relationship is that the brutality and exploitation of the latter is masked behind layers of politeness and seduction, and so sometimes can be mistaken for generosity. We've already seen this confusion in action. Last February it was a big news story when Apple refused to help the FBI crack the company's iPhone encryption. Most people understood this as Apple standing up for its customers, protecting their privacy rights. This was an absurd misreading that requires that one willfully forget everything else Apple does with customer data. In fact, it was a play for sovereignty, a move pointed at demonstrating the independence of Apple in particular and Silicon Valley in general from the state, a step toward the left-fascist politics of the future. In understanding the move as a form of protective noblesse oblige, Apple customers revealed nothing so much as their willingness to become customer-subjects of Apple Nation™.

Based on the definition of fascism provided above, it is perhaps more accurate to call this ideology post-fascist, or fascistoid, showing clearly its close relation to fascism (and even closer relation to neo-reactionary ideology) and its departure from the central figure of the nation-state.

In some ways, "Jupiterian" fascists are most advanced of all in their embrace of the "control" as described in Deleuze (1992). In the "societies of discipline" so famously described by Foucault, people are enclosed in rule-governed institutions structured like prisons and factories, passing from one to the other through one's life: the family, the school, the barracks, the factory, the hospital, the prison. According to Deleuze, in the latter half of the twentieth century, these "interiors" are in crisis as the society shifts from a "society of discipline" to a "society of control". Instead of a uniform interior which had a definite timespan (an obvious beginning and end, certain hours regularly) that encloses the mass and molds the individual into a mass, control modulates (Deleuze cites the expansion of the bonus system such that all salaries vary, in order to pit individual—or rather,



“dividual”—workers against each other in a struggle for a higher wage for themselves as “dividuals”), never ends (Deleuze cites “lifetime education”, but also the option of “indefinite postponement” in *Der Prozeß*, which is in contrast with “apparent acquittal”, associated with disciplinary societies), and shackles through debt. For Deleuze, the “corporation” replaces the “factory” as model. Deleuze’s examples are quite illuminating:

In the *prison system*: the attempt to find penalties of “substitution,” at least for petty crimes, and the use of electronic collars that force the convicted person to stay at home during certain hours. For the *school system*: continuous forms of control, and the effect on the school of perpetual training, the corresponding abandonment of all university research, the introduction of the “corporation” at all levels of schooling. For the *hospital system*: the new medicine “without doctor or patient” that singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk, which in no way attests to individuation—as they say—but substitutes for the individual or numerical body the code of a “dividual” material to be controlled. In the *corporate system*: new ways of handling money, profits, and humans that no longer pass through the old factory system.

Consider also the expansion of debt through student loans, credit cards, and mortgages, and its use to compel. Consider, in addition, the increasing demand that workers do their work outside of 9–5 hours: at home, while commuting, while on vacation. It is no accident that Deleuze notes that, while the old societies of sovereignty (preceding the societies of discipline) required simple machines and the societies of discipline relied on “machines involving energy”, the new societies of control rely on computers. That the two ideologies with closest ties to Neo-Byzantium (neo-reaction and Jupiterianism) would both enthusiastically endorse control is then unsurprising.

For Deleuze, control has replaced discipline; indeed, it is true in an important way that our society is *post-disciplinary*, but we must remember that many tools of discipline remain part of the toolbox of control, such as enclosure.

## 6.1 The Spectre of “Fake News” and Conspiracy Thinking In the Shadow of Liberalism

Since the presidential election of 2016, liberals have increasingly shown their reliance on conspiracy thinking. In the immediate wake of the election, there was a brief period where liberals actually attempted to introspect, but introspection is anathema to liberalism, and so it was soon replaced with a conspiracy theory centred on Russia. This was a transparent way to allow liberals to avoid investigating their failure, to cling on to the seeds of Jupiterian politics (the “New Democrat” ideology of the 1990s) despite the stench of rot. Thus Jupiterianism is heir to a grand tradition of American nationalists using “foreign agents” as a scapegoat: “I saw Goody Proctor with Putin!” Considering the hegemony of Jupiterians (their location at the commanding heights of the culture industry), we have all become hostage to this delusion. Namely, they have used their influence to demand that platforms take an increasingly censorious role towards so-called “fake news” (really, any news site which does not hold to a centrist narrative, whether fake or real: this includes leftist sites), which, while ostensibly meant to combat right-wing propaganda, increasingly targets left-wing critics of Jupiterianism.

It is important to note that even for the liberals, conspiracy thinking is not in their long-term interest. No one outside the culture industry cares about this conspiracy theory, and it will not unseat the administration. In fact, the only rational way for a right-wing administration to handle these allegations would be to veer ever closer towards war with Russia, to prove even more antagonistic towards it than liberal critics. This strategy can be seen in the early 21st century itself with the Iraq War: in the 1990s and in 2000, the Democrats had ran to the right of Republicans on foreign policy, with Gore in 2000 criticising Bush for a lack of support for “nation-building”—in the 2000s, Bush then invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Democrats had no choice but to cheerlead for him.

## 6.2 Hindenburg’s Return: Jupiterians Accomodating the Alt-Right

The similarities between Hillary Clinton’s 2016 run and Paul von Hindenburg’s 1933 run begin with the slogans “I’m With Her” and “mit ihm”. The Jupiterians, who maintain hegemony through the culture industry, have mimicked their predecessors in their accommodationism, too. An early example of this was an adoring portrayal of Richard Spencer by Mother Jones—the headline: “Meet the dapper white nationalist riding the Trump wave”. The alt-right has targeted universities as recruitment grounds (as can be seen by their deadly rallies in Seattle, Charlottesville, and Gainesville)—when challenged, the university leadership, through the rhetoric of free speech and diversity of opinions, chooses to allow the rallies, despite the pattern of violence—thus legitimizing the alt-right as “reasonable discourse” despite the well-known ways in which fascist agitators twist reasonable discourse to magnify irrational, “closed” elements—something even a dyed-in-the-wool liberal like Karl Popper understood in his otherwise vulgar, propagandistic tract. Indeed, the ACLU, the association most associated with liberalism, paved the way for this in their weakening of the “fighting words” doctrine in the 1970s (fighting to allow a Nazi rally in Skokie, Illinois, a town whose population included then a large number of Holocaust survivors)—though they didn’t lift a finger to stop McCarthyism—and poured money into making sure the deadly Charlottesville rally would happen under the same legalistic defense. When the alt-right’s violent rallies met with local, anti-fascist response, the media tried to equivocate between the “two sides” (as centrists always do), despite the fact that all the violence was done by the alt-right (and their police collaborators), a view which only feeds into alt-right rhetoric.

## 7 Notes for an Exit

The suggestions on praxis in the previous paper were poorly thought-out; I included them because I felt it was necessary to address praxis in some way, yet I knew not how. The past year has given more material to the search for a way out of our accelerating descent, but let me now be explicit that these are merely notes: they are far from complete.

Before we can exit, we must first prevent neo-fascism from a complete take-over of society. Thus, despite the limited aims of anti-fascism (not aiming at revolution), we must support anti-fascism in its attempt to stop fascist recruiting and counter the terror of fascist vigilantes.

An important element (though one which, it must be emphasized, is not sufficient to stand by itself, contra the general stance of the academy and especially Gramscians) is a better attitude towards culture than any of the ones endorsed by the Church/Industry of Jupiter, which operate on a logic of purity/contamination: if a cultural artifact is claimed

by a more traditional fascist, it is ceded immediately to them by the Church/Industry of Jupiter, its meaning not contested or even investigated. This does not mean *lowering our standards*, it simply requires that the critical attitude avoid the sensationalist logic of purity.

However, in order to fully end fascism, including its spectre, its preconditions, and its traces, capitalism itself must be destroyed. Capitalism tends towards monopoly and to crisis, both of which pave the way for fascism; it is fundamentally tied to the racist patriarchy that leads to the fear of cuckoldry.

A nostalgic movement, one towards localism and primitivism (the latter implicitly, if no longer explicitly due to the current unpopularity of deep ecology, relying on genocide), is one that we must oppose. As reminded in Fisher (2012) (an insightful defense of accelerationism with a critique of Land's collapsing "capitalism into what Deleuze and Guattari call schizophrénia, thus losing their most crucial insight into the way that capitalism operates via simultaneous processes of deterritorialization and compensatory reterritorialization"), we cannot give in to a moral critique, but rather must "see capitalism as the most productive moment of history and the most destructive at the same time and [...] think Good and Evil simultaneously, and as inseparable and inextricable dimensions of the same present of time": "Marxism is nothing if it is not accelerationist". Or, to quote Land himself in Land (1994): "Hot cultures tend to social dissolution. They are innovative and adaptive. They always trash and recycle cold cultures. Primitivist models have no subversive use." Land argues in *Teleoplexy* (drawing on Böhm-Bawerk, whose criticisms of Marx have been thoroughly rebutted by Rubin and Hilferding among others) that the only possible teleoplexy is Kapital the blind idiot god; we must conceive a rebuttal.

What is to be done with the platforms? The politics of platform capitalism is inherently reactionary not only due to being a form of capitalism (which at least shows a non-revolutionary or non-socialist outlook, but doesn't imply by itself anything more than a conservatism) due to its assumption of governmental roles, the necessity of mass surveillance for profit, and the tendency towards monopoly capital. The roles filled by many platforms, such as Facebook, are important: a move to peer-to-peer platforms, while currently unsuccessful (witness the failure of Diaspora), may become a necessity in the future. However, this doesn't really address the practical question in the moment; our politics cannot simply be "switch to Diaspora!" due to the entrenchment of platforms under capitalism and due to its political voluntarism.

We cannot afford two more decades in the wilderness. "Socialism or barbarism" may once have been a slogan; it is now the human condition. The time has come for "Leftists" (and especially their most parasitic sub-groups—post-leftists, cultural studies liberals, and LARPerS in roughly that order—for whom politics is already merely æsthetic) to answer the following questions: whose side are you on? and are you revolutionaries or lifestylelists? You must decide—will you agitate among the masses, or will you write bad poetry? Will you organize to feed the people and meet their needs, or will you pray before an idol, ritualistically role-playing revolutionaries of the past? Will you commit yourself to the liberation of humanity or will you fantasize about "destroying the means of production"? Will you blather meaningless statements about "working-class unity"—or in the inverse, fetishize fragmentation and marginality—or will you work to make that unity a real presence through confronting even the uncomfortable contradictions? All the various components of a revolution must be demystified and analyzed in the current context. Yes, it *is* our job to educate and serve the people—all those who object, whether in the name of their sacred

*Einzige* or liberal social justice, must be chased out along with their self-righteousness. In addition, due to the complicity of mass, reformist, electoral parties (especially given the “Jupiterian” turn), and due to their exceptional ability to co-opt and eviscerate radical movements, we must constantly remain vigilant of co-optation and must refuse any attempt to serve up our organization to opportunists. There are no guarantees of success, but we must never stop striving for it.

Close this world, open the next. Death to Videodrome—long live the new flesh.

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